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Leading up to explicit mirror self-recognition, infants rely on two crucial sources of infor-
mation: the continuous integration of sensorimotor and multisensory signals, as when see-
ing one’s movements reﬂected in the mirror, and the unique facial features associated with
the self. While visual appearance and multisensory contingent cues may be two likely can-
didates of the processes that enable self-recognition, their respective contribution remains
poorly understood. In this study, 18-month-old infants saw side-by-side pictures of them-
selves and a peer, which were systematically and simultaneously touched on the face with
a hand. While watching the stimuli, the infant’s own face was touched either in synchrony
or out of synchrony and their preferential looking behavior was measured. Subsequently,
the infants underwent the mirror-test task. We demonstrated that infants who were coded
as nonrecognizers at the mirror test spent signiﬁcantly more time looking at the picture of
their own face compared to the other-face, irrespective of whether the multisensory input
was synchronous or asynchronous. Our results suggest that right before the onset of mir-
ror self-recognition, featural information about the self might be more relevant in the pro-
cess of recognizing one’s face, compared to multisensory cues.
Correspondence should be sent to Maria Laura Filippetti, Department of Psychology, University of
Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ, Essex, United Kingdom. E-mail: m.ﬁlippetti@essex.ac.uk
Infancy, 1–14, 2018
© 2018 The Authors. Infancy published by
Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of International Congress of Infant Studies
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
ISSN: 1525-0008 print / 1532-7078 online
DOI: 10.1111/infa.12236
THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS
OF INFANT STUDIES
The ability for mirror self-recognition is viewed as a fundamental milestone in the
development of self-awareness. Normally, when encountering our mirror reﬂection, we
recognize the facial features we see and identify them as belonging to the self. This is
true despite the continuous, albeit subtle, visual changes that our face undergoes over
the course of years. The increasing familiarity with our unique visual appearance is
indeed a crucial type of cue for self-identiﬁcation. However, to maintain a stable repre-
sentation of oneself and one’s own identity, the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror
also involves the integration of tactile, proprioceptive, and motor events which need to
be matched with the visual information provided by the reﬂection (Lewis & Brooks-
Gunn, 1979; Rochat, 2003). The role of multisensory contingency and visual appear-
ance for self-awareness has been studied in infants (for a review, see Rochat, 2011),
nonhuman primates (Gallup, 1970; Povinelli, Rulf, Landau, & Bierschwale, 1993; Povi-
nelli et al., 1997), and adults (Platek, Thomson, & Gallup, 2004; for a review, see Tsa-
kiris, 2016).
Developmentally, a large set of studies have indeed demonstrated infants’ early abil-
ities to discriminate visual-proprioceptive contingency arising from their own move-
ments (Bahrick & Watson, 1985; Morgan & Rochat, 1997; Reddy, Chisholm,
Forrester, Conforti, & Maniatopoulou, 2007; Rochat & Morgan, 1995; Schmuckler &
Jewell, 2007; Watson, 1994), as well as perfectly synchronous multisensory cues related
to the body (Filippetti, Farroni, & Johnson, 2016; Filippetti, Johnson, Lloyd-Fox,
Dragovic, & Farroni, 2013; Zmyj, Jank, Sch€utz-Bosbach, & Daum, 2011). However,
while these studies show that multisensory contingency becomes functional quite early
in life, the ability to discriminate this information does not necessarily imply that the
infant is able to recognize these movements and body parts as belonging to the self
(Bremner, Holmes, & Spence, 2012; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). Independently of
multisensory contingency that can support momentary recognition, infants have to also
build a more diachronic and permanent representation of the self, as, for example,
when recognizing one’s photograph in the absence of current multisensory or sensori-
motor input (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Rochat, 2009). For example, to recognize
our own face as standing for ourselves, we must be familiar with our own facial fea-
tures and be able to successfully associate them to ourselves every time we encounter
our own mirror reﬂection (Lewis, 2011; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Rochat, 2009,
2011), eventually building a more permanent oﬄine (i.e., mnemonic) representation of
our appearance (Rochat, 2003).
To investigate the ontogenesis of self-recognition, the reference paradigm has been
developed by Gallup (1970) with chimpanzees, and by Amsterdam (1972) with human
infants. In Gallup’s original investigation, the “mark test of mirror self-recognition”
(Gallup, 1970) entailed placing a red spot on the chimpanzee’s forehead and testing
whether, when faced with a mirror, the animal attempts to reach for and remove the
spot. In 1972, Amsterdam developed a similar approach for testing mirror self-recogni-
tion in human infants. In this revised task, infants were marked on the side of the nose
with a rouge by their mother and subsequently exposed to the mirror (for limitations
of this procedure, see Gallup, 1994). The presence of self-directed behavior in front of
a mirror is often operationalized as an understanding that the face seen in the reﬂec-
tion is one’s own face (Rochat, 2003, 2009). Evidence suggests that from 18 to
24 months, infants show a speciﬁc set of mark-directed (e.g., touching the mark) and
self-conscious (e.g., coy/embarrassment) behaviors (e.g., Amsterdam, 1972; Bertenthal
& Fischer, 1978; Brooks-Gunn & Lewis, 1984; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). This is
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considered a demonstration of the presence of self-recognition, meaning that infants
are not only able to recognize the contingent and featural properties of their own
reﬂection, but they can also associate them as standing for themselves (Legerstee,
1999; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Rochat, 2003).
This test has been often criticized for providing a reductionist picture of self-con-
scious behavior in development and for disregarding the role of self-exploration of the
multisensory correspondences (see, e.g., Rochat, 2011). Nevertheless, the presence of a
speciﬁc set of skills and behaviors when encountering a mirror around 2 years of age
suggests that infants seem to acquire new crucial knowledge about the self at this
developmental age. Speciﬁcally, these studies seem to suggest that the maturation of
multisensory contingency precedes recognition of visual appearance (Lewis & Brooks-
Gunn, 1979), whereby infants ﬁrst become familiar with this perfect multisensory
matching and only later on they build a representation of their own face as standing
for themselves (Bigelow, 1981). In line with this proposal, Povinelli, Landau, and Peril-
loux (1996) modiﬁed the classic mirror test by introducing a temporal delay of 3 min
on the video footage of 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old toddlers. They found that only 4-year-
olds show a signiﬁcant percentage of reaching behavior toward the sticker, in the
attempt of removing it (Povinelli et al., 1996). Miyazaki and Hiraki (2006) extended
Povinelli and colleagues’ ﬁndings and demonstrated that self-recognition is facilitated
when children are allowed to experience the contingent relationship between their own
actions and visual feedback (Miyazaki & Hiraki, 2006). While the use of videos instead
of mirror reﬂection might have impaired children’s performance at this self-recognition
task (Suddendorf, Simcock, & Nielsen, 2007), the understanding that the current self
exists beyond the perfect matching of visual-proprioceptive correspondences seems to
gradually emerge from the repetitive exposure to multisensory contingent information.
The conundrum of the interplay between contingent cues and featural information
for self-recognition becomes even more critical when we look at how manipulations of
these components can produce a change in self-identiﬁcation in adults, where a robust
representation of how we look like is well in place. In these studies, the simultaneous
stroking of the participant’s face with another person’s face leads to the incorporation
of a certain percentage of the other-face into one’s own self-identiﬁcation (Paladino,
Mazzurega, Pavani, & Schubert, 2010; Serino et al., 2015; Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard,
& Aglioti, 2010; Tajadura-Jimenez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012; Tsakiris, 2008). Studies
that have explored the neural underpinnings of self-recognition in adults have further
highlighted that processes other than mere visual perception are engaged in the identi-
ﬁcation of one’s own face in the mirror. For example, Apps, Tajadura-Jimenez, Ser-
eno, Blanke, and Tsakiris (2013) used fMRI during the enfacement illusion to
demonstrate the interplay between unimodal and multisensory brain areas, such as the
inferior occipital gyrus, the right temporo-parietal junction, and the intraparietal sul-
cus. Serino et al. (2015) employed an ecological version of the enfacement illusion to
show that after being exposed to visuo-motor synchrony in a virtual mirror setup,
online sensory–motor activation was linked to activity over inferotemporal–occipital
areas of the cortex. Therefore, it seems that our mental representation of how we look
like is ﬂexible and susceptible to a number of sensory signals (i.e., motor, propriocep-
tive, tactile, and visual signals), suggesting that multisensory contingency is a mecha-
nism that is not only involved in the construction of the mental representation of one’s
own face (see, e.g., Platek et al., 2004), but also continuously contributes to the update
of our self-representation (Tajadura-Jimenez, Grehl, et al., 2012).
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Despite the apparent crucial role that both featural information and multisensory
contingent cues play in self-recognition, the relation between these two mechanisms in
the developmental phase preceding explicit mirror recognition remains poorly under-
stood. In fact, it is unclear whether bottom-up multisensory cues such as propriocep-
tive and tactile inputs are necessary for infants in this process, or whether building up
gradual experience with one’s own facial feature is suﬃcient for the emergence of self-
recognition. Studies that have speciﬁcally investigated children’s ability to recognize
their pictorial representation have reported controversial results. While some demon-
strated that this ability comes later in development, compared to the ability to recog-
nize oneself in front of a mirror (Courage, Edison, & Howe, 2004; Legrain,
Cleeremans, & Destrebecqz, 2011; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979), other studies have
shown that 4- to 9-month-old infants prefer to look at the image of a peer compared
to their own image (Bahrick, Moss, & Fadil, 1996; Legerstee, Anderson, & Schaﬀer,
1998; Rochat & Striano, 2002). Nielsen, Dissanayake, and Kashima (2003) explored
the looking behavior of 9- to 24-month-old infants in a longitudinal study, while pre-
sented with a prerecorded video of their face and another infant’s face, which were
marked with red lipstick in one condition and unmarked in the other. From 12 months
of age, after each looking-time session the authors also investigated the infants’ perfor-
mance at the mirror test. They found that a visual preference for the self-face only
becomes apparent with the onset of mirror self-recognition, at 18 and 24 months of
age. That is, infants that show mark-directed behavior at the mirror test also display a
visual preference for their own image at that testing session, irrespective of the experi-
mental condition (marked versus unmarked; Nielsen et al., 2003). The present experi-
ment aimed to further tackle this issue, by investigating the contribution of facial
appearance and multisensory integration in mirror self-recognition.
We measured the looking behavior of 18-month-old infants, presented with previ-
ously taken pictures of themselves and a peer, which were systematically and simulta-
neously touched on the cheek with a hand (see Addabbo et al., 2015 for a similar
experimental paradigm). While watching the video display, the infant’s own cheek was
touched either in synchrony or out of synchrony by a brush. Subsequently, the infants
underwent the mirror-test task. We hypothesized that infants who did not show any
mark-directed behavior at the mirror test (nonrecognizers) would show a preferential
looking to the self-face picture compared to the other-face picture. In fact, in the pro-
cess of learning to recognize the self, we expected that infants who do not pass the
mirror test would pay more attention to their own facial features compared to another
infant’s visual appearance (Nielsen et al., 2003). We also hypothesized that this
increased looking to the self would be apparent in the synchronous condition, as
opposed to the asynchronous condition. If multisensory integration represents a valu-
able learning tool for diﬀerentiating between what pertains to the self versus the other
(Tsakiris, 2016), we expected nonrecognizers to be more attuned toward the self-face
when experiencing visual–tactile synchrony, as opposed to asynchrony.
METHODS
Participants
Infants were recruited from a database of parents who had agreed to participate in
child development studies. Fifty-one infants were recruited and invited to participate
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to the study. Of those, twenty-six 18-month-old infants (15 girls, 11 boys, mean
age = 18 months and 2 days, SD = 8.93 days) completed all stages of the study and
are included in the ﬁnal analysis. The 28 infants who are excluded from the ﬁnal anal-
ysis were excluded on the basis of the following issues: equipment failure (1), lack of
behavioral data due to fussiness (4), or lack of interest on watching the video screen
accompanied by increased interest toward the brush during the stroking action, which
prevented us to disentangle the role of visual–tactile synchrony (23). Prior to testing,
informed consent was obtained from all parents. Testing only took place if the infant
was awake and alert. The local Ethics Committee (Department of Psychology, Royal
Holloway University) approved the study protocol.
Stimuli and procedure
Looking-time task
Infants were tested in a sound-attenuated room and sat on their parent’s lap. The
distance between the screen and the infant’s head was approximately 100 cm. Stimuli
were displayed on a 32″ screen monitor. Parents were asked to refrain from talking
and interacting with the infant during the stimulus presentation.
The design comprised two experimental conditions and one baseline condition.
The experimental stimuli consisted of previously taken pictures of the infant tested
and a peer that were stroked on their left cheek by a hand every 6 sec by a virtual
hand. Using a preferential looking procedure, we displayed both photograph pictures
side by side (self-face and other-face). Pictures were taken against a black back-
ground, asking the parent to sit the baby on a chair. The two hands appeared on the
screen after 2 sec from stimulus presentation. The entire “touch” action lasted
approximately 2.5 sec (“hands approaching” action: 700 msec followed by 700 msec;
“stroking” action: 1 sec), followed by 1 further second of stimulus presentation where
the hands were absent (Figure 1). Each experimental condition comprised ﬁve dis-
played touches to both faces, and the two trials were 30 sec long. The other-infant
face was selected using a yoked-controlled design; that is, the photograph of each
infant is used as the “peer stimulus” for the next infant (Bahrick & Watson, 1985;
Legerstee et al., 1998). This method allows balancing for diﬀerent visual features per-
ceived by the infants in each condition (Legerstee et al., 1998; Nielsen et al., 2003).
During both experimental conditions, the experimenter, hidden behind the infant,
used a soft paintbrush to touch the infant face on her right cheek, either in syn-
chrony or in asynchrony with the stroke seen on the video screen. Therefore, the two
experimental conditions diﬀered only in that one was time delayed relative to the seen
touch by 3 sec. In other words, while in the synchronous condition the experimenter
applied the touch on the cheek simultaneously with the touch seen on the video, in
the asynchronous condition the same brush event occurred with a 3-sec lag from the
touch occurring on the screen (Gergely & Watson, 1999; Zmyj, Hauf, & Striano,
2009). To ensure infants’ attention was maintained throughout the experimental ses-
sion, a 5-sec baseline (full color, static images of animals and objects) appeared at
the beginning of the experimental session and after 30 sec of the paired picture pre-
sentation (between the two experimental conditions). The position of the pictures
(right or left sides of the screen) and the order of the two conditions were counterbal-
anced between infants. The experimental task lasted about 3 min and was run using
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E-Prime 2.0.10 software. Stroking of the infant’s cheek was manually delivered by the
experimenter using a soft medium-sized paintbrush (width = 25 mm) and was always
delivered in the specularly congruent location. Each stroke lasted approximately
1 sec. As infants were seen to lose their attention during the preferential-looking task,
we decided to conduct this part of the study ﬁrst, to enhance the chances of data col-
lection (see also Nielsen, Suddendorf, and Slaughter, 2006 for similar experimental
procedure).
Mirror-test task
After this experimental session, the experimenter prepared the setting for the mir-
ror-test task (Amsterdam, 1972). The caregiver was asked to sit on a chair away from
the infant’s sight and from a large mirror (to avoid that their reﬂection could interfere
with the task). A video camera was directed at the mirror from an angle of the room.
The mirror-test task comprised a warm-up phase and a testing phase. To familiarize
with the mirror, in the warm-up phase the experimenter encouraged the infant to
approach the mirror. This phase was concluded once the infant made eye contact with
her reﬂection twice and at least once for 2 sec (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993; Kris-
ten-Antonow, Sodian, Perst, & Licata, 2015). Based on this exclusion criterion, we
excluded from the ﬁnal sample two infants (two boys), as they could not be brought
Figure 1 Illustrative example of the experimental paradigm used for the preferential looking-time
task. The two hands appeared on the screen after 2 sec of picture presentation. The “touch” action
lasted approximately 2.5 sec (approaching action: 700 msec followed by 700 msec; stroking: 1 sec).
One further second of stimulus presentation showed both pictures without hands. Each experimental
condition comprised ﬁve displayed touches to both faces, and the two trials were 30 sec long.
6 FILIPPETTI & TSAKIRIS
to focus on their mirror reﬂection (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993; Asendorpf, War-
kentin, & Baudonniere, 1996; Kristen-Antonow et al., 2015). Subsequently, a free play
period allowed the experiment to discreetly apply a spot of odorless, nontoxic, water-
soluble, red face paint on the cheek of the infant, in preparation for the testing phase
of the mirror task. We chose to apply the mark on the cheek to keep the looking-time
task and the mirror-test task as consistent as possible (as in the looking-time task
infants watched and experienced touch on that region of the face). No infant reached
for the mark prior to the introduction to the mirror, indicating that they did not feel
the marking event. After approximately 5 min, the experimenter encouraged again the
infant to approach the mirror (testing phase). Infants who spontaneously displayed at
least one of the marker behaviors listed in Table 1 were considered to pass the test.
Data analysis
Based on the video recordings, an observer (blind to the conditions) coded how long
each infant looked at each of the two side-by-side pictures. For our dependent mea-
sures, we computed the mean of total looking time spent orienting toward the self-face
picture and the other-face picture, in both synchronous and asynchronous conditions.
Inter-rater reliability analysis was performed by a second observer blind to both the
experimental conditions and the hypotheses on 20% of the sample and revealed a
score of Pearson’s r = 0.80. For the mirror-test task, one observer coded the behavior
oﬄine from the recorded observations. Recognition was scored as either present or
absent, based on the marker behaviors listed in Table 1. The ﬁnal sample comprised
26 infants: 15 (12 girls, three boys) recognizers and 11 (four girls, seven boys) nonrec-
ognizers. Verbalizations were not considered a marker behavior of self-recognition in
the present experiment, as the same verbalizations occurred in both familiarization and
testing phases—for example, saying “Baby” (with the exception of one infant, who in
the testing phase touched the mark and said “Face”). Inter-rater reliability analysis
was performed by a second observer blind to the hypotheses on 20% of the sample,
and the observed agreement between the two coders was 100%.
RESULTS
We ﬁrst tested with a repeated-measures ANOVA whether the side of the screen, the
order of condition, the gender of the infant, or the gender of the peer in the looking-
time task had a signiﬁcant eﬀect. None of these factors revealed any signiﬁcant eﬀects,
and therefore, data were averaged across these. We next performed a repeated-mea-
sures ANOVA with Stroking mode (Synchronous verus Asynchronous) and Face
TABLE 1
List of Marker Behaviors, Used to Operationalize the Mirror Test in the Present Experiment
Nonverbal behavior
Touch mark/nose
Touch the region of the mark
Try to touch mark (including opposite cheek)
Staring at the mark, accompanied by self-conscious behavior (e.g., shame, coyness)
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Identity (Self verus Other) as within-subject variables and Self-recognition Group (rec-
ognizers verus nonrecognizers) as between-subject factor. The main eﬀects of Stroking
mode, F(1, 24) = 0.02, p = .89, Face Identity, F(1, 24) = 1.39, p = .25, and Self-recog-
nition Group, F(1, 24) = 0.05, p = .82, were not signiﬁcant.
The three-way interaction Self-recognition Group 9 Stroking mode 9 Face Identity
was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 24) = 0.06, p = .80, indicating that the type of multisensory
stimulation (i.e., synchronous or asynchronous) when watching self-face or other-face
did not inﬂuence recognizers and nonrecognizers diﬀerently. However, we found a sig-
niﬁcant interaction, Face Identity 9 Self-recognition Group, F(1, 24) = 8.14, p = .009,
g2 = 0.25. Using planned pairwise comparisons to interpret the interaction, we found
that while infants that passed the mirror test did not show any preferential looking to
the self- or other-face across the two conditions, t(14) = 1.34, p = .20, infants that
did not pass the test looked signiﬁcantly more to the self-face, compared to the other-
face, t(10) = 2.53, p = .03, d = 1.18 (Figure 2). Nonparametric analysis (Wilcoxon
signed rank test) on the number of nonrecognizer infants who showed a tendency to
look longer at the self-face image (N = 10) showed that the median looking-time rank
to the self-face was statistically signiﬁcantly higher than the median to the other-face,
Z = 2.80, p = .005. Nonparametric statistics (Wilcoxon signed rank test) on the num-
ber of recognizer infants who showed a tendency to look longer at the other-image
(N = 9) indicated that the median looking-time rank to the other-face was signiﬁcantly
higher than the median to the self-face, Z = 2.66, p = .008.
Additionally, we investigated the distribution of ﬁrst look and longest look duration
in the sample. We found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the ﬁrst look to the self or
to the other in recognizers and nonrecognizers, v2(1, N = 26) = 0.735, p = .391—recog-
nizers: self (26.9%), other (30.8%); nonrecognizers: self (26.9%), other (15.4%). Simi-
larly, we found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the longest look to the self or to the
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Figure 2 Mean total looking time to the self and to the other of infants who passed (recognizers, in
dark gray) and did not pass (nonrecognizers, in light gray) the mirror-test task. Only nonrecognizers
looked signiﬁcantly longer at the self-face compared to the other-face. Error bars show standard
errors (SE).
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other in recognizers and nonrecognizers, v2(1, N = 26) = 1.766, p = .184—recognizers:
self (26.9%), other (30.8%); nonrecognizers: self (30.8%), other (11.5%) (see Table 2
for number of infants showing the phenomena).
DISCUSSION
The ability for self-face recognition is a key aspect of self-awareness and identity
(Gallup, 1970; Rochat, 2011). To recognize our face as distinct from others, we must
associate the motor, proprioceptive, and tactile input we experience with its mirrored
compatible visual event, and gradually become familiar with the featural information
uniquely associated with our face. While previous developmental work has indepen-
dently investigated the respective role of visual appearance and multisensory contin-
gent cues for self-awareness, little is known about their concurrent interplay in the
gradual acquisition of self-recognition.
In the current study, 18-month-old infants watched their face and another infant
face being touched by a hand either in synchrony or in asynchrony with a touch expe-
rienced on their own cheek. Subsequently, the infants underwent the mirror-test task,
and their reaction in front of a mirror to a mark applied on their cheek was measured.
We hypothesized that infants who did not show any mark-directed behavior during
the mirror test would also display a visual preference for their own face and that this
preference would be more apparent in the visuo-tactile synchronous, compared to the
asynchronous, condition. In line with our ﬁrst hypothesis, we found that infants who
did not show any mark-directed behavior at the mirror test (i.e., infants that were
coded as nonrecognizers) spent signiﬁcantly more time looking at the picture of their
own face compared to the other-face. However, this visual preference was present irre-
spective of whether the visual stroking action seen on the screen was synchronous or
asynchronous to the touch they felt on their own face. Based on these ﬁndings, we
demonstrate that in the absence of explicit mirror self-recognition, infants pay more
attention to their own familiar facial features compared to unfamiliar facial features of
others. In contrast, multisensory contingent cues (here expressed as synchronous visuo-
tactile signals) may not be the primary or the only signals used to discriminate between
self and other facial features at this speciﬁc developmental stage. However, given the
limited sample size, it is important that future research replicate the present ﬁndings.
Extensive work on the role of multisensory contingent cues for self-awareness comes
from both the infant and adult literature, suggesting the fundamental role of this infor-
mation for the development of our bodily self (e.g., Bahrick & Watson, 1985; Filippetti
et al., 2013; Watson, 1994; Zmyj et al., 2009, 2011), as well as the update of body
TABLE 2
Distribution of the First Look and Longest Look in Recognizers and Nonrecognizers
First look Longest look
Other-face Self-face Other-face Self-face
Recognizers 8 7 8 7
Nonrecognizers 4 7 3 8
Nonrecognizers’ ﬁrst look and longest look were to the self-face.
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ownership (e.g., Blanke & Arzy, 2005; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard,
2005) and self-identiﬁcation (e.g., Tajadura-Jimenez, Grehl, et al., 2012; Tajadura-
Jimenez, Longo, Coleman, & Tsakiris, 2012; Tsakiris, 2008). However, while adult
studies can provide us with evidence of individuals’ ability to associate that speciﬁc
body part as belonging to the self (through report and questionnaires), infants’ studies
are obviously limited by their inability to report their experience. Hence, the infant’s
ability to show a visual preference to contingent versus noncontingent multisensory
cues may not be linked to the ability to refer to her own body when detecting the
matching between the two sensory modalities (Bremner et al., 2012). As Lewis and
Brooks-Gunn (1979) suggested, while self-recognition might at ﬁrst be highly depen-
dent on both visual appearance and visual-proprioceptive contingency, from 15 to
18 months infants might start relying more on their own facial features to recognize
their mirror reﬂection as standing for themselves (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). Thus,
the absence of a preference for synchronous visuo-tactile cues in our study might be
explained by this developmental shift in attention. However, as the present study used
visuo-tactile information in the absence of any motor signal (e.g., visual and proprio-
ceptive inputs), it is possible that the rather unfamiliar experience of being touched on
the cheek by a brush might have driven attention away from the synchronicity of the
sensory information. To rule out this possibility, further studies should overcome the
technical limitation of using visuo-proprioceptive and/or sensorimotor synchronous
cues between self and other and develop experimental paradigms that allow for the use
of the ecological and more familiar sensorimotor contingency. The use of virtual real-
ity (VR) experiments could potentially provide a crucial insight into the underlying
mechanisms of self-recognition, through the manipulation of synchronous and asyn-
chronous visuo-motor contingencies applied to the self and other. As shown by Serino
et al. (2015) with adults, the use of virtual mirror setups could disentangle the respec-
tive contribution of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals in the development of
mirror self-recognition, as well as the distinction between self and others.
In the present study, we compared performance in the mirror test with looking
behavior in response to pictorial representations of the self and the other. Previous stu-
dies investigating children’s ability to recognize their pictorial representation have
reported controversial results, with some research suggesting early self-other discrimi-
nation abilities (Bahrick et al., 1996; Legerstee et al., 1998; Rochat & Striano, 2002)
and other demonstrating later development (Courage et al., 2004; Legrain et al., 2011;
Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). In a longitudinal study, Nielsen et al. (2003) showed
that a visual preference for the self-image only becomes apparent with the onset of
mirror self-recognition. In our experiment, we found that infants who did not pass the
mirror test looked signiﬁcantly more to their own face, compared to the peer’s face,
perhaps suggesting the presence of an increased interest for one’s own facial features,
coincident with the gradual emergence of the ability to recognize themselves in front
of a mirror (Courage et al., 2004).
It should be noted that the task demands of a preferential looking-time paradigm
(such as the one we used here) are not the same as the explicit mirror self-recognition
task. Preferring to look at what is familiar is diﬀerent from touching or removing the
mark as a sign of self-awareness. The latter may reﬂect an active engagement with
one’s appearance to modify it. The former task (i.e., preferential looking) was designed
to evaluate the respective contributions that multisensory input and visual familiarity
are making on infant’s viewing preferences. Given these diﬀerences across the tasks,
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we set out to investigate whether it was visual familiarity or multisensory contingency
that would be associated with performance in explicit self-recognition. Our results sug-
gest that infants who do not pass the explicit self-recognition task also prefer to look
at their own face: This preference may reﬂect the fact that nonrecognizers have not yet
established a robust enough representation of their own visual appearance and are
using such instances, independently of the pattern of multisensory stimulation as our
results show, to further consolidate the mental representation of their own face. Once
this representation is robust enough, infants would no longer show a visual preference
for their own face within the social context of our ﬁrst task, and this behavior would
also be associated with explicit self-recognition.
Overall, our results contribute to the growing literature that investigates the link
between familiarity to one’s own facial features and the ability to exhibit explicit mir-
ror self-recognition. However, assuming that the mirror-test is a valid measure of self-
recognition (for critics on the validity and meaning of the test, see Bahrick et al., 1996;
Broesch, Callaghan, Henrich, Murphy, & Rochat, 2011; Heyes, 1994, 1995; Rochat,
2007, 2009), we suggest that the way infants process their own self-image changes dur-
ing the ﬁrst 2 years of life. In line with Nielsen et al. (2006), evidence for a visual pref-
erence for other-face in young infants, rather than their own face (Bahrick et al., 1996;
Legerstee et al., 1998; Rochat & Striano, 2002), could be interpreted as an early dis-
crimination between self and other on the basis of familiar visual features, perhaps a
ﬁrst stepping-stone into the ability to distinguish between self-face and other-face
beyond the multisensory input, a process that can eventually lead to a more diachronic
representation of one’s appearance (Legrain et al., 2011). In fact, while visuo-motor
and tactile contingency might be the strongest cue for self-other discrimination at early
stages, the presence of a visual preference for the self-image found in our 18-month-
old infants (as well as in Nielsen et al., 2003) might underpin a diﬀerent developmental
ability, namely the ability to compare the stored mental image of the self with the mir-
ror reﬂection, and to eventually use eﬃciently a mnemonic representation of one’s
appearance across diﬀerent contexts (e.g., recognizing one’s face in photographs,
videos, etc.; see Legrain et al., 2011). However, as these studies used diﬀerent experi-
mental paradigms and age ranges, it is diﬃcult to draw any deﬁnitive conclusions
about how developmental diﬀerences in preferential looking to self-face verus other-
face might inform into this ability.
An intriguing ﬁnding of our investigation is the absence of any self-speciﬁc visual
preference shown by infants that passed the mirror test (recognizers). While these
infants show a tendency to look at the other infant face, this increase in looking time
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the looking time to the self-face. It is perhaps note-
worthy that our looking-time task has a social context as two facial identities are pre-
sented at the same time. As our results suggest, the subgroup of recognizers have a
more robust mental representation of their visual appearance and this may make their
social attention to self and others more ﬂexible, allowing them to eﬃciently switch and
alternate their attention from the self to the other. The fact that explicit mirror self-
recognition seems to occur at the same time as the expression of social emotions (e.g.,
pride and shame; see Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989; Rochat, 2009) suggests
that infants who have mastered a robust enough representation of themselves can more
easily switch between being attending to others and attending to themselves. Therefore,
in terms of our looking-time variable, this ability would result in comparable looking
times to self and other. The current ﬁndings have important implications for the
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understanding of the development of self-recognition. Crucially, our results suggest
that 18-month-old infants, presumably right before the onset of mirror self-recognition,
show a visual preference for their own face, compared to another peer face. As this
visual preference persists irrespective of multisensory contingent cues, these ﬁndings
suggest that at this age, featural information might be more relevant in the process of
recognizing one’s face, compared to multisensory cues. Future research should investi-
gate this topic further by exploring how diﬀerent degrees of contingency (e.g., visual,
proprioceptive, and motor signals) relate to the development of self-recognition, and
how synchronous versus asynchronous multisensory stimulation applied to the self and
the other contributes to the development of self-other diﬀerentiation, as well as the
implementation of social interactions.
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